On Sunday night, John Harbaugh made the "fourth-down decision heard ‘round the world" when he decided to go for it on fourth down in his own territory to seal the Ravens win against the Chiefs. And while I would love nothing more than to spend a column extolling the virtues of Harbaugh and Lamar Jackson, I am going to try to limit the amount of Ravens content I force you guys to read, so instead I am going to focus on one of the most important subplots of the game- the logic behind Harbaugh’s gutsy (and correct) decision, and what it can tell us about how to sell analytics to skeptics, and to the general football public.
Too often, the discussion around analytics revolves strictly around numbers. We see what the numbers say about what a certain decision should be, but the discussion stops there. However, there is always something behind the numbers. As much as some people would like you to believe otherwise, analytics is a lot more than simply a computer telling you what to do. At its core, it is a rethinking of the logic behind the way coaches make certain decisions. However, many in the analytics community do not feel like they need to take the time to explain their logic. There is a certain arrogance that exists on sites like PFF where you are asked to assume that they are smart and what they are saying is right, without actually being brought behind the curtain. If someone is presented with a piece of data that contradicts the way they’ve thought about football for their entire life, they have a right to be skeptical. Unfortunately, that skepticism is too often replaced with either straight denial or a refusal to engage with the data at all, while those pushing analytics have not always done the best job at explaining why the numbers say what they do.
Coaches often say that they respect the numbers but you also need to have “a feel for the game,” which is assuming that the numbers don’t have any feel or logic behind why a certain decision should be made. This is not the case, because there is inherently a logic behind what the numbers say- and if coaches allowed themselves to understand that logic, it would maybe allow them to have a better “feel for the game.”
While everyone said that Harbaugh made his decision because the numbers said to, Harbaugh himself said otherwise. After the game, Harbaugh said to Albert Breer of MMQB that “My gut basically said that we need to get the first down, or they’re gonna be able to get back down the field… I just felt like we had a better chance to get the fourth down [than stop the Chiefs] and I think the analytics might agree- I don’t know if they’d line up or not. I can’t say for sure if they would. But that was really on me on that one.”
This is the perfect example of how gaining a better understanding of analytics informs the way a coach views the game and the manner in which he makes gut calls. The Ravens have been perhaps the most willing of any franchise in the NFL to employ analytics, leading the revolution of going for it on fourth down. Sure, the Ravens look at the numbers before every play, but they’ve made an effort to also adapt the philosophies behind analytics. The truth is the numbers themselves aren’t that extreme in the typical neutral fourth down situation. A fourth and 1 from the opponent's 40 yard-line in the second quarter is usually a situation in which the analytics say that going for it only gives you a 1-2% win probability increase- not enough to be the inherent difference between winning and losing. That is because over the course of a game there are so many important plays that have yet to happen, that one fourth-down decision does not dramatically change the number of ways the game could go. Telling a coach to go for it because he has a 1% better chance of winning when it goes against every football instinct of theirs is not a way to convince others of your argument. Rather, going for it in that situation is about a general philosophy, one of aggressiveness. Because a team is very likely to convert a fourth and one, the rewards of converting- being closer to a touchdown- will add up over the course of a game and over the course of a season, because while you may lose some field position, you will ultimately add more points than you will lose.
When you not only change what data you look at but change your philosophy, it then becomes easier to make the type of decision that Harbaugh made when the answer is obvious. According to EdjSports, my personal favorite fourth-down decision model, going for it increased the Ravens’ chances of winning by 17%, a massive number. But Harbaugh’s decision was not correct because of what the numbers said, because it was not a decision over numbers. It was a decision over whether he wanted to put the game in the hands of Lamar Jackson, or the hands of Patrick Mahomes. When putting it in that light, it suddenly doesn’t seem that hard of a decision at all.
While explaining the philosophy behind general fourth-down aggressiveness is great, it doesn’t account for specific situations where the numbers say to go for two- but don’t worry, there’s a very logical reason behind that too. Take for example a team scoring a touchdown down 14. For as long as football has existed, the typical move has been to kick the extra point to go down 7, then get the ball back and try to go down and score again. But when a team scores that first touchdown it actually makes sense to go for two. If a team scores down 14 they will have to score again for this decision to matter at all, and if they miss the first two they will obviously have to go for two the second time. The good news for them is that two-point conversions are converted around half the time, meaning that they are unlikely to miss two straight conversion attempts, so if they score two touchdowns, the game is likely to at least be tied. But if they get the first conversion, they can suddenly win the game with just a touchdown and an extra point. Considering the fact that we live in a world where it is acceptable for a coach to go for a conversion for the win when they score a touchdown down seven, meaning that we understand the idea of being aggressive and going for the win, it should be encouraged to go for two down 14. That is because in both situations you have the same reward- winning the game- but going for two down 14 includes the possible safeguard of tying the game if you miss the first time. If you go for two the second time and miss, you just lose the game. While it is possible to miss the conversion twice and lose the game, the rewards and built-in safeguards of going for two down 14 outweigh the risks of missing two straight times.
It also is the correct move for a team to go for two when they score a touchdown down 15. This is because while we know at some point they will have to go for it to tie the game, they are no more likely to make it the second time than the first. Meanwhile, if a team misses the first time, they now know they need two possessions to make up the score, rather than the game being over if they miss the second time. While people say that kicking makes it a one-possession game, that is really a lie- an eight-point game is really more like a 1.5 possession game. That is because if a team misses the two, they still need an extra possession to go ahead. Waiting to go for it just prolongs the mystery of whether you are going to need that extra possession, whereas going for it the first time means you know earlier whether or not you will need it. Making it does the first time does the same thing for you then as it would later, but if you happen to miss it means that rather than playing for one drive to get the ball and go for a conversion where if you miss the game is over, you are now able to be more aggressive and are given more of a chance to make up the score if you were to miss. We saw this exact situation occur in a game between the Falcons and Cowboys last year. The Cowboys missed the conversion meaning that when they got the ball back they knew they had to have a sense of urgency to leave themselves time for an onside kick and extra possession- which they converted, leading to a game-winning field goal drive and a one-point win. While missing means you are likely to lose, you are slightly less likely to lose if you miss the first time rather than the second time.
While I just presented you with some situations where there is inherent logic behind following analytics, there is not a simple answer for everything. There are some situations where there are too many permutations at play to make a simple decision, that one should probably go ahead and just blindly trust the numbers. One example came when the Ravens got a penalty going for two when they scored a touchdown to put them down five, a situation where there is no obvious answer whether it is a better move to kick an extra point to make it a four-point game or still go for a seven-yard conversion to make it a three-point game. But understanding the general philosophy behind analytics would make a coach more trusting of the numbers in a situation where there is no inherent logical right move. What’s more, it allows them to think about the game in a more evolved way. While there are some coaches who just refuse to listen to reason and will always make poor decisions (see Zimmer, Mike), actually explaining why the numbers say something rather than simply what they say will create not only more correct decisions from coaches but better gut calls and general philosophies. John Harbaugh has made a concerted effort to understand analytics over the last few years- and that understanding allowed him to have a better “feel for the game” to make the right call to beat the Chiefs. Shouldn’t more NFL coaches follow suit?
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Week 3 Picks
Last Week’s Record: 12-5 (0-1 Locks)
Season Record: 19-16
*Lines as of Thursday Afternoon
Panthers(-8) @ Jaguars
Bills (-7) vs Washington Football Team
Bears (+7.5) @ Browns
Titans (-5.5) vs Colts
Chargers (+7) @ Chiefs
Patriots (-3) vs Saints
Falcons (+3) @ Giants
Steelers (-3) vs Bengals
Cardinals (-7.5) @ Jaguars
Jets (+10.5) @ Broncos
Raiders (-3.5, lock) vs Dolphins
Buccaneers (-1.5) vs Rams
Seahawks (-2) @ Vikings
Packers (+3.5) @ 49ers
Cowboys (-4) vs Eagles